T he effects of experimenter characteristics have a long-noted, but infrequently discussed, influence on the measurement of social attitudes (Silverman, 1974) . Generally, this effect has been described as a social desirability effect. Social desirability effects often complicate the measurement of social attitudes, especially when self-report measures are used (Millham & Jacobson, 1978; Paulhus, 1984) . Scores on attitude tests often show a bias toward the more socially acceptable position because test takers, whether to conceal their prejudices or in denial of them (Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006; Nederhof, 1985) , soften their responses such that prejudice that exists in actuality goes unmeasured. The tradition of explaining the effect of experimenter characteristics in terms of social desirability by asserting that participants purposely alter their test results in response to their perceptions of the experimenter has a long history (Kállai, Barke, & Voss, 2004; Kintz, Delprato, Mettee, Persons, & Schappe, 1965; Nederhof, 1985; Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; Silverman, 1974) . For example, Kállai et al. (2004) found an increase in participants' self-reported pain tolerance when tested by an experimenter of the opposite sex, and interpreted this as evidence that participants intentionally misrepresented their pain tolerance to impress the experimenter. Similarly, Riemer and Shavitt (2011) , examining the social desirability effect across cultures, described the effect as being based in impression management motivations. Lalwani et al. (2006) , also examining social desirability across cultures, agreed with Riemer and Shavitt (2011) that the effect was composed partly of a self-deceptive shift in attitudes and partially of a conscious desire for impression management. However, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) , a relatively new test of implicit prejudice, seems to have thrown this traditional explanation into doubt. The existing literature has suggested that the IAT successfully prevents typical social desirability effects by measuring automatic responses, but also that it may be susceptible to the effects of experimenter characteristics. The present study attempted to replicate and directly illustrate this phenomenon, and to examine whether it is caused by intentional, conscious cognitive processing.
The IAT was designed to detect social prejudices ABSTRACT. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) was designed to measure attitudes at the level of automatic unconscious associations. The IAT has largely been shown to be effective in eliminating the ability of test takers to alter their scores toward a socially desirable outcome through intentional conscious cognitive processing. However, some limited evidence has also suggested that IAT scores are influenced by the characteristics of an experimenter, much like many explicit tests, by an effect usually explained in terms of social desirability. The present study was intended to illustrate and resolve this apparent conflict in the literature. Participants expressed less antigay prejudice when in the presence of a gay male experimenter (p = .018), experienced ego-depletion when consciously attempting to manipulate their expressions of prejudice (p = .040), and were not capable of influencing their IAT scores. Results suggested that the IAT is susceptible to an experimenter characteristics effect, and it is argued that this effect is not caused by conscious cognitive processing.
at the level of automatic unconscious associations. Thus, the IAT was intended to measure attitudes without the influence of controlled cognitive processing. This serves to greatly reduce the influence of socially desirable responding (Greenwald et al., 1998) . When taking the IAT, participants are asked to quickly sort items into categories. The categories used, in the case of the Sexuality IAT, are "Gay and Good," "Gay and Bad," "Straight and Good," and "Straight and Bad." The categories are presented two at a time. Terms including homosexual, heterosexual, painful, and beautiful, and images with similar semantic content must be sorted into these categories. Reaction time and accuracy are then used to calculate the strength of participants' cognitive associations. For example, if participants are quicker and more accurate at various points in the test when sorting the word homosexual into the "Gay and Bad" category than the "Gay and Good" category, their score will reflect more prejudiced implicit attitudes. The IAT has been shown to have moderately strong psychometric properties, with strong convergent and discriminant validity and acceptable internal consistency reliability. An exception is the IAT's low test-retest reliability (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001 ). This result, although problematic at first glance, is actually unsurprising given the nature of the test. Test takers are asked to respond quickly to the test prompts, but are unaware that one of the IAT's central measurement mechanisms is reaction time. It may be reasonably assumed that this concealment is hard to maintain after the participant has taken the test and experienced noticeable changes in their reaction time across category configurations. This means that their retest results are more susceptible to explicit cognitive control, and to social desirability effects. In other words, the IAT is particularly susceptible to learning effects. Such a conclusion has not only been supported by the Banse et al. (2001) result mentioned above, but also by Steffens (2004) , who reported that participants are more likely to succeed at influencing their IAT scores when they have prior experience with the test. Perhaps the best way to describe the techniques involved in manipulating IAT scores is that they are initially hidden, but ultimately intuitive. Even test takers with no prior experience with the IAT can be coached to influence the results of their first time with the test (Kim, 2003) .
Because the IAT measures prejudice indirectly, objections may fairly be raised that it actually measures some slightly different construct. Two such constructs seem likely. The first possibility, that IAT scores are only indicative of differing levels of familiarity with different stimuli, has been deemed improbable (Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003; Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001 ). However, the other possibility, that IAT scores may simply be reflective of a person's level of exposure to societally held attitudes, has not. This objection would be problematic, were it not for the existence of evidence that IAT scores predict the use of stereotypes in making social judgments (Amodio & Devine, 2006) . The mental construct measured by the IAT, then, predicts discriminatory behavior. A more operationally useful definition of prejudice could hardly be hoped for 1 . The IAT has been shown to be successful in preventing consciously controlled responses such as those implicated in social desirability effects (Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Steffens, 2004) assuming the test taker has no prior experience with the test. However, some evidence has suggested that IAT scores may be influenced by experimenter characteristics. Lowery, Hardin, and Sinclair (2001) found that the Race IAT scores of White participants indicated more anti-Black prejudice when the experimenter was White than when the experimenter was Black. This kind of effect, experimenter characteristics altering participants' scores on prejudice tests, is common in explicit attitude tests. Participants generally show less prejudice toward groups to which the experimenter belongs. This result fits comfortably with an understanding that explicit measures of prejudice are highly susceptible to social desirability effects and, for example, have been found using tests of attitudes toward race (Anderson, Silver, & Abramson, 1988; Lowery et al., 2001 ) and sex (Flores-Macias & Lawson, 2008) . However, the phenomenon is more surprising in an implicit test like the IAT, which is more or less impervious to social desirability effects.
This apparent conflict has raised several questions. First, do typical experimenter characteristics effects, already well supported for characteristics like race, age, and sex, occur when the characteristic in question is sexual orientation? Second, is the IAT, known to be successful in controlling for 1 It is still possible to argue that IAT scores only indicate a person's awareness of the prejudices at work in their environment and that such awareness is strongly correlated with the tendency to employ stereotypes in making social judments. However, because awareness of prejudice and actual prejudice are functionally equivalent under this model, the objection does nothing to detract from the IAT's usefulness. social desirability in participants without coaching or prior experience, somehow susceptible to experimenter characteristics effects as suggested by Lowery et al. (2001) ? The present study was intended to replicate and resolve this apparent conflict in the literature by demonstrating that experimenter characteristics effects were not caused by explicit, purposeful cognitive processing.
Experiment 1
Although the effect of experimenter characteristics in areas such as race, sex, and age has been well-established, the literature has been sparse and conflicted on the issue in regard to sexual orientation. One study, which is now over 30 years old, found that participants' explicitly stated attitudes toward sexuality in general, but not toward gay male, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations, were more conservative and less permissive in the presence of an interviewer perceived to be gay than in the presence of an interviewer perceived to be straight (Cuenot & Fugita, 1982) . This finding contradicted what should be expected of a typical experimenter characteristics effect. Rather than actually shifting their expressed attitudes toward the experimenter's social group, participants freely expressed their negative attitudes. They even expressed more conservative attitudes about sexuality in general, which the authors noted might have been intended as a socially acceptable way to subtly denigrate the gay experimenters (Cuenot & Fugita, 1982) . It is possible that the typical effect of experimenter characteristics on the result of attitude tests simply does not apply to the case of sexual orientation. However, it is likely that, in the historical context of 1982, there was very little social pressure to express positive attitudes toward gay male, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations. There might be considerably more pressure to do so today, as evidenced by legislative shifts in the area of same sex marriage.
As such, Experiment 1 was designed to measure the influence of an experimenter's perceived sexual orientation on the results of explicit tests of attitudes toward gay male sexual orientation, and to test for a similar experimenter characteristics effect on the IAT. It was hypothesized that participants who interacted with a gay male experimenter would show less prejudice toward gay male sexual orientation on both types of test, which would be consistent with most of the literature on experimenter characteristics (Anderson et al., 1988; Flores-Macias & Lawson, 2008; Lowery et al., 2001) , and not with the Cuenot and Fugita (1982) finding.
Method
Participants. Seventy-one undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses were recruited for participation. Twenty-two participants identified as being men, and 49 identified as being women. On a 7-point Likert-type scale, participants reported a mean religiosity of 4.54 (SD = 1.27) with higher scores reflecting higher religiosity. Data were not collected on participant ethnicity or age. Participants were awarded credit toward a course requirement as compensation.
Procedure. After institutional review board approval (IRB No. 2013033) , participants were randomly assigned to a gay male experimenter condition (n = 28), an undifferentiated male experimenter condition (n = 20), or a no experimenter condition (n = 23). Perceived sexual orientation of the experimenter was manipulated using differences in clothing. The undifferentiated experimenter wore jeans and an unmarked shirt, and the gay male experimenter wore rainbow colored shoes and belt, and a bright pink shirt with the words "Some dudes marry dudes. Get over it." These two roles were played by two different experimenters. A gay male experimenter, rather than a lesbian or bisexual female experimenter, was chosen because participants generally express more intense prejudice toward gay men than toward lesbians (Herek, 2000) , and the undifferentiated experimenter was also a man to control for an experimenter characteristics effect for sex.
The participant sat in the room with the gay male experimenter and undifferentiated experimenter participants, or left the participant alone in the room for the no experimenter condition while they completed two explicit prejudice tests including the Modern Homophobia Scale (MHS; Raja & Stokes, 1998) and the Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Scale (HATH; Larsen, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980) followed by the Sexuality IAT. Reliabilities were adequate for the self-report measures (see Table 1 ). The MHS and HATH each offer a series of statements about gay men, and participants rate their agreement on a Likert-type scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Raw scores are calculated by averaging all items, after reverse-scoring the appropriate items. The IAT used was from the website of Project Implicit ® , a research and demonstration tool made available by the test's creators. After the IAT was completed, results were displayed. Each participant took the MHS and HATH before the IAT so that their IAT result would not affect the way they responded to the explicit tests. Data from participants who identified as being part of the LGBT community or who identified as having taken the IAT before were excluded from analyses (n = 3).
Results
All test scores were converted to z scores. A 3 (test type: IAT, MHS, HATH) x 3 (experimenter: gay male, undifferentiated, alone) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effects of test type and experimenter condition. There was a significant main effect for experimenter condition, F(2, 65) = 7.46, p < .001, η p 2 = .19, indicating that there were differences by condition between test scores for participants in the no experimenter condition (M = -0.03 SD = 0.11), the undifferentiated experimenter condition (M = 0.38, SD = 0.13), and the gay male experimenter condition (M = -0.35, SD = 0.13), with higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice. There was no significant main effect for test type, F(2, 130) = 0.04, p < .96, η p 2 = .001, indicating that there were no significant differences between test scores on the IAT (M raw = 5.76, SD raw = 1.49), which measures attitudes implicitly, the MHS (M raw = 4.43, SD raw = 0.36), an explicit measure of attitudes toward gay men, and the HATH (M raw = 3.98, SD raw = 0.29), another explicit measure of attitudes toward gay men. Higher scores indicated higher levels of prejudice for each test (see Table 1 ).
Independent-samples t tests were conducted to compare scores from each test across different experimenter conditions. Between the no experimenter and undifferentiated experimenter conditions, scores were significantly different on the MHS, t(46) = -2.49, p = .017, indicating that participants in the no experimenter condition (M = -0.23, SD = 1.04) expressed significantly less prejudice on the MHS than those in the undifferentiated experimenter condition (M = 0.50, SD = 0.96), with higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice. This was an unexpected result, perhaps suggesting that participants felt some social pressure to express mildly negative attitudes toward gay men in the presence of an apparently heterosexual experimenter. This pattern was evident on all three tests (see Figure 1 ). However, there were no significant differences between the no experimenter and undifferentiated experimenter conditions on the HATH, t(46) = -0.65, p = .52, or on the IAT, t(46) = -1.12, p = .27. Between the no experimenter and gay male experimenter conditions, scores were significantly different on the IAT, t(46) = 2.17, p = .035, indicating that those in the no experimenter condition (M = 0.11, SD = 0.98) expressed more prejudice on the IAT than those in the gay male experimenter condition (M = -0.55, SD = 1.10), with higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice (see Figure 1) . However, there were no significant differences between the no experimenter condition and gay male experimenter conditions on the MHS, t(46) = -0.17, p = .87, or on the HATH, t(46) = 1.50, p = .14. Between the undifferentiated experimenter and gay male experimenter conditions, scores were significantly different on the MHS, t(46) = 2.41, p = .021, indicating that participants in the undifferentiated experimenter condition (M = 0.50, SD = 0.96) expressed more prejudice on the MHS than those in the gay male experimenter condition (M = -0.18, SD = 0.84). A similar result was found on the IAT, t(46) = 3.27, p = .002, indicating that participants in the undifferentiated experimenter condition (M = 0.39, SD = 0.66) expressed more prejudice on the IAT than those in the gay male experimenter condition (M = -0.55, SD = 1.10), with higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice for both tests (see Figure 1) . These results supported the hypothesis that participants would express less prejudice in the presence of a gay male experimenter. However, there was no significant difference between the undifferentiated experimenter and gay male experimenter conditions on the HATH, t(46) = 1.55, p = .13.
Discussion
Consistent with the hypothesis, participants showed less prejudice on the MHS and the IAT, but not on the HATH, in the gay male experimenter condition than in the undifferentiated experimenter condition. These results conflicted with those of Cuenot and Fugita (1982) in suggesting that, like other explicit attitude tests, explicit tests of attitudes toward gay male sexual orientation are susceptible to an experimenter characteristics effect similar to that found for race (Anderson et al., 1988; Lowery et al., 2001 ) and sex (Flores-Macias & Lawson, 2008) . Participants also expressed more prejudice on the MHS when in the presence of an undifferentiated experimenter than when taking the test alone. This seems to be evidence that participants felt some pressure to express more negative attitudes toward gay men when in the presence of an apparently heterosexual experimenter. However, this effect was not replicated on the HATH or the IAT, so the evidence for this conclusion was tentative at best.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided evidence that the IAT is susceptible to an experimenter characteristics effect. Taken alone, it would be fair to interpret this result to mean that participants were consciously influencing their scores, and thus that the IAT is susceptible to social desirability. A second experiment was conducted to examine the nature of conscious manipulation of attitude test scores.
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) demonstrated that self-regulatory processes draw on a single limited inner resource. This resource may be depleted, a process termed ego-depletion, through a wide variety of cognitive tasks (Baumeister et al., 1998; Geeraert & Yzerbyt, 2007; Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2003) . One task that has been shown to induce ego-depletion is the suppression of stereotypic thought (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994) . If participants taking the IAT are consciously suppressing their stereotypic thought with the goal of indicating a more socially desirable attitude, this suppression should be evident in an increased degree of ego-depletion as measured by performance on subsequent posttests. In this case, two posttests were used: the Buying Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Rook & Fisher, 1995) , which has been used in previous research as a measure of ego-depletion (Vohs & Faber, 2007) , and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1991) , a measure of the respondent's tendency to present themselves in a positive, socially desirable way. The expectation that this particular regulatory task would be depleting relied upon an assumption that participants' actual attitudes toward gay men would be at least mildly negative. This assumption was supported by the results of Experiment 1, in which the average of participants' raw IAT scores was 5.76 with a maximum possible score of 7 (see Table 1 ).
We hypothesized that participants asked to regulate their responses on the IAT would show evidence of ego-depletion on the subsequent cognitive tasks, with BIS scores indicating higher levels of buying impulsiveness and BIDR scores indicating lower levels of socially desirable responding. On the basis of the existing literature, we also hypothesized that participants would be unable to influence their scores on the IAT, but would be able to influence their scores on the MHS.
Method
Participants. Fifty-seven undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses were recruited for participation. Twenty-nine participants identified as being men, and 39 identified as being women. On a 7-point Likert-type scale, participants reported a mean religiosity of 4.22 (SD = 1.58), with higher scores reflecting higher religiosity. Data were not collected on participant ethnicity. Participants were awarded credit toward a course requirement as compensation.
Materials. Experiment 2 made use of the MHS and the IAT, described in Experiment 1, and also of two scales used to measure ego-depletion: the BIS and the BIDR. Reliabilities were adequate for all explicit self-report measures (see Table 1 .) The BIS (Rook & Fisher, 1995) . In this sense, the test was intended to be sensitive to state-level impulsiveness. The BIS has been shown to have high internal consistency reliability (Rook & Fisher, 1995) . Vohs and Faber (2007) used the BIS as a measure of ego-depletion, finding that participants who were asked to complete a depleting attention-based task expressed more buying impulsiveness than those who were not. The BIDR is a measure of the tendency to respond in socially desirable ways. It consists of a series of statements such as "I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit" and "I am a completely rational person" (Paulhus, 1991) . Participants rate their agreement with these statements on a Likert-type scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Paulhus (1991) suggested two possible scoring methods for the BIDR, one in which only extreme responses are included in the total score, and one in which all responses are included in the total score. The latter method has been shown to produce results that are more psychometrically sound (Stöber, Dette, & Musch, 2002) . In the present study, a total score was calculated by averaging all items. The BIDR has been shown to have moderately strong convergent and discriminant validity (Kroner & Weekes, 1996) , and adequate internal consistency reliability (Li & Bagger, 2007) .
FIGURE 1
Unlike the BIS, the BIDR has not been proven as a measure of ego-depletion. In the existing literature, methods of measuring ego-depletion have been as robust and varied as methods of inducing it. They have included speed on puzzle tasks, patience while watching long movies (Baumeister et al., 1998) , persistence at unsolvable puzzles (Webb & Sheeran, 2003) , persistence at frustrating games, and even the amount of unpleasant liquid that participants could force themselves to drink (Tice et al., 2007) . It seems likely that participants' ability to regulate their responses in order to respond in socially desirable ways may be similarly influenced by resource depletion.
In the present study, higher BIS scores indicated higher levels of buying impulsiveness, and higher BIDR scores indicated a greater tendency to respond in socially desirable ways. The MHS and IAT were scored as reported in Experiment 1. Again, higher scores indicated higher levels of prejudice in both tests.
Procedure. After institutional review board approval (IRB No. 2013052), participants were randomly assigned to either a regulation condition (n = 19) or a no regulation condition (n = 26), and also, independently, to either an IAT condition (n = 22) or an MHS condition (n = 23), resulting in four groups. Participants in the regulation condition were instructed to respond to the attitude test with as little prejudice as possible. Participants were given the following written instruction: "Please respond with as little prejudice as you can. Try to make your score reflect as much acceptance toward gay individuals as possible." Participants in the no regulation condition were instructed to respond honestly.
Participants completed either the Sexuality IAT or the MHS, depending on their condition. Each participant then completed both the BIS and the BIDR. The IAT used was from the website of Project Implicit ® . Data from participants who identified as being part of the LGBT community or who identified as having taken the IAT before, including anyone who had participated in Experiment 1, were excluded from analyses (n = 12).
Results
All test scores were converted to z scores. A two-way 2 (test type: IAT, MHS) x 2 (regulation: regulated, not regulated) ANOVA was conducted to determine the differences between participants' scores, based on regulation condition and pretest type. A main effect for regulation condition was found for scores on the BIS, a measure of buying impulsiveness that is also used here as a measure of ego-depletion, F(1, 45) = 6.56, p = .014, η p 2 = .138, indicating that participants who were asked to regulate their expression of prejudice scored significantly higher on the BIS (M = 0.41, SD = 1.06) than participants who received no such instruction (M = -0.28, SD = 0.71). Higher BIS scores indicate a greater tendency toward impulsive spending, and also an increased degree of ego-depletion (see Figure 2 ). This result provided support for the hypothesis that regulating the expression of prejudice would cause ego-depletion. However, no main effect was found on BIS scores for pretest type, F(1, 45) = 0.69, p = .41, η p 2 = .017, or for an interaction between regulation condition and pretest type, F(1, 45) = 2.01, p = .164, η p 2 = .047. This result did not support the hypothesis that regulating IAT results would cause more ego-depletion than regulating MHS results. No effects on scores from the BIDR, a measure of tendency to respond in socially desirable ways, were significant, Fs < 0.13. Independent-samples t tests were conducted to determine participants' ability to regulate their scores on the MHS and the IAT. Participants' scores did not differ on the IAT by regulation condition, t(20) = -0.69, p = .50, indicating that participants who were asked to regulate their expressions of prejudice (M = -0.16, SD = 1.06) did not score significantly differently on the IAT than participants who were asked to respond as honestly as possible (M = 0.12, SD = 0.85). This supported the hypothesis that the IAT would be impervious to attempts at regulation. However, participants' scores did not differ on the MHS either, t(21) = 1.05, p = .31, indicating that participants who were asked to regulate their expressions of prejudice (M = 0.29, SD = 0.88) did not score significantly differently on the MHS than participants who were asked to respond as honestly as possible (M = -0.15, SD = 1.05). This was a surprising finding, considering that the MHS, an explicit test, should have been relatively easy to manipulate.
Discussion
Experiment 2 was designed to determine whether conscious self-regulation on the IAT, an implicit test, and on the MHS, an explicit test of attitudes toward gay men, caused ego-depletion. Also of interest was whether participants would be able to influence their results on the IAT. The hypothesis that participants who were asked to regulate their stereotypic thought would experience ego-depletion was supported on the basis of BIS scores, as evidenced by the main effect of regulation condition, but not on the basis of BIDR scores, potentially indicating that the BIDR might be a poor measure of ego-depletion. The hypothesis that participants would be unable to influence their IAT scores was supported, but participants' apparent inability to influence their explicit test scores suggested that this result might have been due to an ineffective manipulation.
As hypothesized, participants were unable to influence their results on the IAT, a finding consistent with other literature, as discussed above. However, participants also appeared to be unable to influence their results on the MHS, an explicit test that should have been very easy to fake, assuming sufficient participant motivation. Participants in both regulation conditions expressed very low levels of prejudice on the MHS, indicating that the lack of statistically significant difference might be due to a floor effect. Of course, another possible explanation for participants' apparent inability to influence their MHS scores was that the regulation manipulation was ineffective.
One particularly interesting finding was that the amount of ego-depletion caused by attempting to regulate IAT performance was similar to that caused by attempting to regulate MHS performance (see Figure 2) . On the one hand, this result was surprising, given the difference in complexity between the implicit and explicit tests. The IAT, being structurally more complex, should be more depleting than the MHS, a very simple test. One possible interpretation is that the regulation task was not particularly demanding, regardless of pretest. However, the similar degree of ego-depletion might also simply have been evidence that the regulatory process was the same across tests. In other words, participants might have attempted to undergo the kind of conscious, controlled cognitive process when taking the IAT that is also at play in socially desirable responding.
FIGURE 2 Experiment 2: BIS Scores by Pretest Condition and Regulation Condition
Note. BIS = Buying Impulsiveness Scale; IAT = Implicit Association Test; MHS = Modern Homophobia Scale. Scores are presented as z scores. Error bars indicate standard error. Higher scores indicate higher levels of buying impulsiveness. There was a significant main effect of regulation condition, F(1, 45) = 6.56, p = .014, ηp 2 = .138, but not for pretest type, F(1, 45) = 0.69, p = .41, ηp 2 = .017, or for an interaction between regulation condition and pretest type, F(1,45) = 2.01, p = .164, ηp 2 = .047. 
Experiment 3
In Experiment 1, we found that experimenter characteristics had an effect on IAT scores, possibly due to a social desirability effect. Experiment 2 provided some evidence that attempts to regulate IAT performance might cause ego-depletion. Experiment 2 did not provide evidence that participants were unable to purposefully influence their results on the IAT because, although this seemed to be the case, participants apparently were not able to influence their MHS results either.
A third experiment was conducted to clarify whether IAT results could be consciously manipulated, and to examine the relationship between the experimenter characteristics effect and the attempt to manipulate IAT scores. This relationship was important because experimenter characteristics effects are traditionally conceived as at least partially being an intentional attempt to manipulate scores (Kállai et al., 2004; Kintz et al., 1965; Nederhof, 1985; Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; Silverman, 1974) . Participants were asked to regulate their scores on the IAT and MHS in the presence of gay male and undifferentiated experimenters. We hypothesized that an experimenter characteristics effect would again be found in both IAT and MHS scores, with participants showing less antigay prejudice in the presence of an experimenter perceived to be gay. We also hypothesized that participants would be unable to intentionally influence their IAT scores, but that they would be able to influence their MHS scores.
Method
Participants. Seventy-five undergraduate students enrolled in psychology courses were recruited for participation. Thirty-three participants identified as being men, and 42 identified as women. On a 7-point Likert-type scale, participants reported a mean religiosity of 3.61 (SD = 1.35), with higher scores reflecting higher religiosity. Data were not collected on participant ethnicity. Participants were awarded credit toward a course requirement as compensation.
Procedure. After institutional review board approval (IRB No. 2014020), participants were randomly assigned to either a gay male experimenter condition (n = 24) or an undifferentiated male experimenter condition (n = 37). Perceived sexual orientation of the experimenter was manipulated using differences in clothing as described in Experiment 1. For this experiment, both roles were played by the same experimenter. The experimenter sat in the room with the participant while they completed the MHS and the Sexuality IAT. Each participant took the MHS before the IAT so that their IAT result would not affect the way they responded to the explicit test. MHS and IAT scores were calculated as described in Experiment 1. Participants were also randomly assigned to either a regulation (n = 29) condition or a nonregulation (n = 32) condition.
For this experiment, the regulation manipulation was strengthened. Participants were given the following written instruction: "Try to respond as if you have a more positive attitude toward gay people than you do toward straight people. In other words, respond like you think a person would who likes gay people more than straight people." The IAT used was from the website of Project Implicit ® . Data from participants who identified as being part of the LGBT community or who identified as having taken the IAT before including anyone who had participated in Experiment 1 or who took the IAT as part of Experiment 2 were excluded from analyses (n = 14).
Results
All test scores were converted to z scores. A multivariate 2 (regulation: regulated, not regulated) x 2 (experimenter: gay male, undifferentiated) ANOVA was conducted to determine the differences between IAT and MHS scores based on regulation condition and experimenter condition. A main effect was found for experimenter condition on IAT scores, F(1, 61) = 11.59, p < .001, η p 2 = .160, indicating that participants who took the IAT in the presence of a gay male experimenter (M = -0.60, SD = 0.86) expressed less prejudice than participants who took the IAT in the presence of an undifferentiated experimenter (M = 0.27, SD = 0.95), with higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice (see Figure 3) . Similarly, a main effect was found for experimenter condition on MHS scores, F(1, 61) = 3.93, p = .052, η p 2 = .060, indicating that participants who took the MHS in the presence of a gay male experimenter (M = -0.30, SD = 4.70) expressed less prejudice than participants who took the MHS in the presence of an undifferentiated experimenter (M = 0.23, SD = 1.08), higher scores again indicating higher levels of prejudice (see Figure 4) . These results supported the hypothesis that an experimenter characteristics effect would be found on both the IAT and the MHS, replicating the results of Experiment 1.
No main effect was found for regulation condition on IAT scores, F(1, 61) 
General Discussion
The present study was designed to address several central questions raised by the literature on experimenter characteristics effects. First, does a typical experimenter characteristics effect occur when the characteristic in question is sexual orientation?
Second, is the IAT susceptible to experimenter characteristics effects, despite successfully controlling for the kind of explicit cognitive processes underlying social desirability? The present study provided some clear evidence in response to these questions. Sexual orientation may be added to the list of experimenter characteristics that have the effect of decreasing participants' level of expressed prejudice toward that group such as race (Anderson et al., 1988; Lowery et al., 2001 ) and sex (Flores-Macias & Lawson, 2008) . Evidence was provided by this study that the IAT and the MHS, in particular, are susceptible to this experimenter characteristics effect. This finding was in direct opposition to the finding of Cuenot and Fugita (1982) that the presence of an experimenter perceived to be gay does not improve participants' expressed attitudes toward gay men. It has been shown empirically that the historical period between the time of that finding and present day was marked by a dramatic and rapid shift in social attitudes on sexuality (Altemeyer, 2002; Andersen & Fetner, 2008) . Thus, the reason for this disagreement may be an actual shift in societal attitudes toward gay male, lesbian, and bisexual sexual orientations. The similarity of the experimenter characteristics effect as evidenced in IAT and MHS scores is useful not only in strengthening the case for an experimenter characteristics effect for gay male experimenters, but also in providing evidence for the construct validities of the IAT and MHS.
The question of the IAT's ability to prevent the influence of conscious cognitive control was answered far less definitively by the present study, primarily because of participants' apparent inability to influence their MHS scores in Experiments 2 and 3. This is surprising because the MHS, an explicit test, should have been quite easy to manipulate. One possible reason for this surprising result, as discussed above, is the presence of a floor effect. Although the Modern Homophobia Scale, in particular, was designed to measure very subtle prejudice against gay men, the potential floor effect suggests that replication with different measures or sample populations is called for. Another possibility is that the experimental manipulations used for the regulation condition were too weak. It is possible that framing the instructions as a challenge (for example, "beat the test," or "fake a result") would be more motivating, both by signaling to the participant that the regulatory task is central to the experiment and by presenting the instructions as a challenge. Further research in this vein should employ instructions like these to strengthen the experimental manipulation. One important implication of the finding that IAT scores can be influenced by experimenter characteristics is that the traditional view of experimenter characteristics effects (i.e., that they are driven by a conscious effort to respond in socially desirable ways; Kállai et al., 2004; Kintz et al., 1965; Nederhof, 1985; Riemer & Shavitt, 2011; Silverman, 1974 ) must be revisited. Indeed, there may be some degree of intentional self-presentation at play in an experimenter characteristics effect; the present study did not rule this possibility out. But attitude changes of this sort also influence social cognition processes on an automatic unconscious level, and to such a degree that the effects are measurable as changes in implicitly held attitudes. Lalwani et al. (2006) provided a useful way of conceptualizing this distinction by dividing the social desirability effect into two components: an impression-management component, which can be seen as explicit, and a self-deception component, which can be seen as implicit.
There are several future research directions implied by this discussion. First, to ensure that the present results were not the product of some unique quality of prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation, the experimenter characteristics effect on IAT scores should be replicated with other versions of the test such as race, sex, religion, and disability.
The results of Experiment 1 suggested that participants might have felt some pressure to express negative attitudes toward gay men in the presence of an apparently straight male experimenter. As described above, the evidence for this pressure was not particularly strong, manifesting only in MHS scores, and not on the HATH or the IAT. It is possible that some such pressure exists, however mild, and a second research direction suggested by this study should address this question.
Third, further research is required to determine the differences between computer-administrated and paper-and-pencil versions of the IAT. Although the literature is relatively consistent in suggesting that IAT scores cannot be consciously manipulated by first-time test takers, Lowery et al. (2001) found that participants' conscious attempts to influence their IAT scores were successful. The version of the IAT they administered involved participants physically making checkmarks on paper, rather than pressing buttons on a keyboard. This is a slower, more controlled process than is involved in the computerized version of the test, meaning participants likely had more time for conscious processing to influence their results. Some evidence already exists that paper-and-pencil versions of the IAT are less sensitive than computer versions (Lemm, Lane, Sattler, Khan, & Nosek, 2008) . Given Lowery et al.'s (2001) unusual findings, this difference may be more dramatic than is currently suspected. The topic deserves further experimentation and discussion.
The present study attempted to find evidence that experimenter characteristics effects, at least as evident in IAT scores, are not caused by intentional, conscious cognitive processing. Because intentional regulation of a person's responses has been shown to cause ego-depletion, another way to provide evidence for this possibility may be to determine whether experimenter characteristics effects cause ego-depletion. An experimenter characteristics effect in the absence of ego-depletion would be strong evidence that experimenter characteristics effects are not caused by conscious manipulation.
Perhaps the effect of experimenter characteristics on the results of self-report attitude tests has been too infrequently examined. One result is that this effect is ignored, or at least underestimated, in the interpretation of test results (Silverman, 1974) . Another result is that the tendency to describe the experimenter characteristics effect as a social desirability effect, and thus as being caused by conscious goal-oriented cognition on the part of the test taker, has gone largely unexamined in the literature. The present study challenged that tendency. Although further research is necessary to strengthen the point, it seems likely that attitude changes that are brought about through exposure to the objects of those attitudes occurs largely at an implicit level, in other words independently from conscious social cognition.
